We develop testable hypotheses regarding how intervention purchases and sales influence bid-ask exchange rate spreads in a pegged exchange rate system. We test these hypotheses on official intraday intervention data provided by the Danish central bank. Our main result is that intervention purchases and sales both exert a significant influence on the exchange rate spread, but in opposite directions. Intervention purchases of the smaller currency, on average, reduce the spread while intervention sales, on average, increase the spread. This remarkable finding illustrates the importance of considering asymmetries when analyzing the influence of large trades in foreign exchange markets.
Introduction
Two categories of foreign exchange intervention studies help bring forward our understanding of why intervention might be influential. The first category of studies focuses on traditional transmission channels such as the portfolio balance and the signaling channels. 1 The second category of studies, to which this paper seeks to contribute, goes beyond the traditional transmission channels and offers microstructure based analyses of the interaction between intervention and exchange rates. The context of our paper is unannounced intervention in a pegged exchange rate system. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has analyzed the effects on exchange rate spreads of intervention in a pegged exchange rate system.
Our starting point is a simple theoretical model of the bid-ask exchange rate spread which we use to formulate testable hypotheses regarding how intervention may influence market perceptions of whether a currency is properly priced. In the model, foreign exchange dealers quickly pass on a central bank trade to their customers, and the bid-ask spread is determined by the slope of the aggregate customer demand curve. This slope, in turn, is directly related to customer uncertainty about market fundamentals.
Within this modeling framework, a wider spread arises when the central bank's intervention induces customer uncertainty. This is the case following an intervention purchase of the major currency on normal days because the customers are unable to 1 See Kumhof (2010) and Fatum (2010) for recent studies that focus on traditional transmission channels of intervention. See Humpage (2003) and Neely (2005) for surveys of the intervention literature. 2 Microstructure based contributions include Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) , Dominguez (2003) , and Chari (2007) . The first study analyses the effects of intervention on exchange rate spreads using official daily intervention data, the two more recent studies use time-stamped newswire reports of intervention to analyze the effects of intervention on the first two moments of the exchange rate and the exchange rate spread, respectively. See Fischer (2006) for a discussion of the accuracy of newswire reports, and Hasbrouck (2007) for a survey of the large literature on the bid-ask spread in financial markets in general.
distinguish such an intervention trade from pressure on the fixed exchange rate mechanism. By contrast, an intervention purchase of the smaller currency is unlikely to be interpreted by the customers as an indication of speculative pressure against the major currency. This fundamental asymmetry translates into the testable hypothesis that intervention sales of the smaller currency leads to an increase in the bid-ask spread while intervention purchases of the smaller currency do not.
To test the predictions of our theoretical framework we employ proprietary data December 2004 time-period. All DN interventions are unannounced. 3 Our study is the first to investigate the intraday effects of unannounced intervention on exchange rate spreads using accurate official intervention transactions data. 4 The DN interventions are carried out under the provisions of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). 5 As detailed in Fatum and Pedersen (2009) , the Danish exchange rate and intervention policy is motivated both by the history of the DKK and by a desire to show the financial markets that, regardless of the Danish unwillingness to adopt the 3 The unannounced DN interventions are rarely reported in the newswire services. A comprehensive Factiva search for both English and Danish language newswire reports of DN interventions, using various search word combinations such as "Danish intervention", "Danmarks Nationalbank", and "Danish Crown" etc., found only four intervention reports in total (three English language reports from Reuters News and one Danish language report from a Danish daily newspaper), none of which mentions neither amount nor timing of the reported interventions. 4 See Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and Pasquariello (2007) for analyses of the intraday effects of the announced Swiss interventions on the exchange rate level and exchange rate spread, respectively. 5 Denmark has participated in ERM II since 1 January 1999. In ERM II, a bilateral central rate and a deviation band is set for the currency of the participating country vis-à-vis the EUR, but not against the currency of the other member states. The official DKK/EUR central rate is 7.46038 DKK/EUR and the official deviation band is set to +/-2.25 percent. The DKK has traded within an even narrower range of +/-0.50 percent around the Danish ERM II central rate. The DN still pursues an active intervention policy. For additional details on the institutional aspects of ERM II and DN intervention, and for a discussion of the recent history of the DKK, see Fatum and Pedersen (2009). 4 EUR, the official Danish exchange rate policy of keeping the DKK virtually fixed vis-à-vis the EUR is credible. The DN interventions, therefore, are not carried out to calm disorderly markets but "serve the purpose of reminding the financial markets of the Danish commitment to keeping the DKK/EUR rate virtually fixed" (Fatum and Pedersen 2009, p. 13 ).
We estimate time-series models of the DKK/EUR bid-ask spread with intervention purchases and sales entering as separate explanatory variables. Our baseline estimations use the weighted least squares (WLS) procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) . As a methodological robustness test we also estimate OLS models with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances.
Our results show that both intervention purchases and sales significantly influence the exchange rate spread, but the effects are asymmetric: Intervention purchases of the smaller currency, on average, reduce the spread; intervention purchases of the large currency, on average, increase the spread. This key result holds up against an array of robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity, coincidental arrival of macro news, testing for break-points, and allowing for the possibility of delayed as well as lead effects. We also show that the asymmetric effects of intervention purchases and sales depend on market conditions in the sense that interventions carried out on "normal" days in terms of exchange rate volatility are influential, while interventions have no effect on the bid-ask spread when the market is abnormally volatile.
These empirical findings are consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis of our theoretical model and give credibility to the theoretical interpretation that the uncertainty 5 of the market regarding the exchange rate decreases when interventions are carried out to strengthen the smaller currency, while the uncertainty of the market increases when interventions indicate that the smaller currency is overvalued. More generally, our results illustrate the importance of considering asymmetries when assessing the influence of large trades such as intervention transactions in exchange rate markets.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model of the bid-ask spread. Sections 3 and 4 detail the data and the econometric methodology, respectively. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents several robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical Background
The central bank's intervention is carried out in the dealer market. Our theory starts from the observation that as direct counterparties to the central bank's intervention trade, dealers are eager to off-load this deviation from an optimal currency position to their customer traders. 7 The price impact and ensuing currency market illiquidity are thus determined by the properties of the customers' aggregate short-run demand curve.
Although focusing on customers rather than dealers, our theory of liquidity is closely related to the inventory theory of the bid ask spread, see Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981) . In our version, customers require a liquidity premium for deviating from their ideal position. Basing our theory on this component of the bid-ask spread, we do not explicitly take into account the pure transactions costs and adverse selection costs often 6 See, for example, Engle and Patton (2004) for an analysis of asymmetric affects of large trades on the bidask spread in the context of stock prices. 7 Individual dealers generally eliminate inventory positions quickly. In the first instance dealers may share positions in the interdealer market, but there is pressure on all dealers to off-load positions before the end of the day. See Osler (2008) for a discussion.
6 investigated by the financial market microstructure literature. This is because, first, the transactions cost component is unlikely to capture any spread asymmetry, as transactions in both directions tend to be equally costly. Second, the theory of adverse selection due to counterparty information is well captured by our later assumption that the bid-ask spread widens when customer uncertainty increases.
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Given that the uncertainty on behalf of currency market traders determines the market's degree of liquidity, the central question becomes how central bank interventions affect this uncertainty. The central bank follows a policy of opacity, and hence does not announce its intervention. It is therefore reasonable to assume that as the intervention occurs, the customers observe only a large order flow, but they cannot discern the origin of the order flow. The first of two key model assumptions states that customer uncertainty in the market is influenced by the possibility that the exchange rate regime is subject to speculative pressure. The second key assumption is that customers on the aggregate respond to intervention as if the order flow can be interpreted in the following way.
Speculative pressure may be based on the premise that the smaller currency is overvalued in the peg, so that the natural conduct of the speculators is to sell the smaller currency and purchase the large currency. We also assume that the marginal effect of the central bank's intervention on the customer uncertainty is greater in a normal market than when volatility is high, simply because, in a volatile market, the central bank's intervention is less likely to be sufficient to induce a detectable change in the market conditions to significantly affect customer uncertainty over fundamentals.
We will derive these implications in a formal model. After presenting the model, we discuss the incentives of the central bank and the dealers not to pass on all their information about the true market conditions to the customer market.
The Model
We model the short-run aggregate demand curve for the smaller currency from a population of many small customers. From the point of view of this customer population, the smaller currency is a risky asset. At a given point in time, it trades at rate p, but has random value θ over the relevant holding period. We assume that the customers hold the common belief that θ is normally distributed with time-varying variance σ 2 >0.
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There is a continuum of competitive customers, maximizing expected utility of end-of-period wealth. The utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and, following Wilson (1968) , there exists a representative customer with 8 CARA utility as a function of aggregate customer wealth, U(w)=-exp(-ρw), with risk aversion parameter ρ>0.
It is well known that the CARA utility function with normally distributed asset returns gives rise to the following simple asset demand function:
(1)
where x denotes the quantity demanded, E(θ) and V(θ)=σ 2 are the customer market's representative expectation and variance for the random variable θ, respectively.
Essentially, customers are willing to purchase the asset when it trades at a price below expected value, and they are willing to take larger positions for a given expected gain the smaller is σ 2 . Thus, the aversion to risk reduces the slope of the demand curve.
The main assumptions of our analysis are the following. First, if there is an unusually large sale of the small currency asset, then the customer uncertainty parameter σ 2 rises. Second, if there is an unusually large purchase of the asset, the customer uncertainty falls. Third, in a more volatile market, a central bank intervention is less likely to induce a detectable change in the market conditions, and hence has less impact on customer uncertainty.
Proposition 1 The spread is directly proportional to the customer uncertainty parameter σ 2 . The first assumption implies that the spread increases when the central bank intervenes with a sale of the smaller currency. The second assumption implies that the spread falls when the central bank purchases the smaller currency. The third assumption implies that both effects are smaller in a more volatile market.

Proof
Suppose that the central bank intervenes with the net trade z while other exogenous market net trades of amount u arrive at the market. Short-run market clearing implies that x(p)=z+u. The resulting short-run equilibrium rate becomes
p=E(θ)-ρσ 2 (z+u).
As is common in the literature on market microstructure, at least since Kyle (1985) , we can interpret dp/du=ρσ 2 as a natural measure of market illiquidity. The round-trade spread, defined as the cost of first buying then selling one unit, becomes 2ρσ 2 . The three results follow from translating each assumption about σ 2 into implications for the spread. □
The proof reveals that the spread is also proportional to the risk aversion parameter ρ. This deep preference parameter is unlikely to be affected by the direction of the central bank's intervention. The central bank's intervention is not announced to the entire market. This suggests that the central bank is hoping to obtain a larger immediate price impact in the market through secrecy than through an openly announced intervention. 11 To the extent that this lack of openness is responsible for the widening bid-ask spread following a sale of the smaller currency, the central bank is willing to obtain a greater price impact at the cost of greater illiquidity.
Data
The intervention data covers all DN interventions in the DKK/EUR market over the 1 Table 1A displays descriptive statistics of the intervention data. Our sample consists of a total of 73 intervention days, encompassing a total of 162 intervention transactions. On intervention days, the average daily intervention amount is EUR 155 million, which is roughly 5.5% of the average daily turnover in the DKK/EUR market.
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The high-frequency DKK/EUR exchange rate data is provided by Olsen and
Associates. The data consists of the bid and the offer spot exchange rate at the end of every 5-minute interval over every 24-hour period. 
The Empirical Model
In order to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the response of the bid-ask spread series to an intervention we employ the WLS procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) . This procedure seems well suited to our particular context where endogeneity in the intervention decision in regards to the state of the market is less of a concern since the interventions under study are not undertaken to calm disorderly markets.
12 First, we model the response of the exchange rate spread, SP t , as a linear function of J lagged values of the spread itself, K lags of (the absolute value of) intervention purchases (I P t ), and H lags of (the absolute value of) intervention sales (I S t ):
As noted earlier, T=64383. We choose J=6 based on the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria and we set K=H=0 in our baseline estimations (we control for delayed effects in our robustness checks). We estimate the conditional mean expression using OLS and obtain the estimated residuals, t ˆ.
19 Next, we model the volatility pattern using the estimated residuals of Equation (2) and the following parameterization:
where the absolute value of t ˆ proxies for the volatility in the 5-minute interval t, M is the number of normalizing constants (in our case 3), n is the number of intervals in a day (in our case 108), t ˆis the one-day ahead volatility forecast for day t (i.e. the day that contains interval t), V and W are the number of lags of interventions included (V=W=1 based on the Schwartz and the Akaike criteria), q is a specific intraday calendar effect, Q is the total number of calendar effects accounted for (Q=8, based on the Schwartz and the Akaike criteria), and t u denotes the residuals (assumed to be standard normal).
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We model the lower frequency intraday pattern (the first term after the vector of constants) using the concept of realized volatility (RV), calculated on 30 minute returns.
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Since the RV forecast cannot capture the observed cyclical intraday patterns (the slow decay in the autocorrelations), we model the higher frequency periodicity by inclusion of a Fourier flexible form (see Gallant, 1981) . 21 Consistent with Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) , who include their macro news variables in the volatility equation, we include the intervention variable (i.e. our main "news" variable) in the volatility model. Certainly, these results make clear the necessity of distinguishing between intervention purchases and intervention sales when assessing the influence of intervention on exchange rate spreads when intervention is aimed at maintaining a smaller currency in a narrow band around a major currency. Moreover, the results provide evidence that unannounced interventions of which the foreign exchange market customers cannot know the origin and, therefore, observe only as large order flows, significantly affect the market's perception of whether a currency is under-or overvalued, and they do so in an asymmetric manner. Intervention aimed at appreciating the smaller currency is interpreted by the market to indicate that speculative pressure against this currency is less 22 Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) analyze intervention in a floating exchange rate over an 18 year period during which intervention occurs on almost a third of the days (intervention occurs on 1512 of the 4723 trading days in their sample).
Results
likely, thereby reducing the price risk associated with holding said currency. This reduced risk is manifested in the narrowing of the exchange rate spread. By contrast, intervention aimed at depreciating the smaller currency is interpreted to indicate that pressure against this currency might be increasing and, as a result, the spread widens.
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Since no previous study has investigated the influence of intervention on exchange rate spreads in the particular context of pegged exchange rates, it is somewhat difficult to compare our asymmetry findings to other studies. Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider our results in light of the most related existing study, namely that of Chari (2007) . In her intraday study of intervention in the JPY/USD rate, she finds that, on average, central bank interventions lead to a widening of the bid-ask spread. At a first glance, therefore, our asymmetry result appears at odds with her findings. However, since all interventions in the JPY/USD rate during her sample period, October 1992 to September 1993 period, are JPY sales, i.e. sales of the relatively smaller currency, our findings are actually consistent with hers, albeit only half of our asymmetry finding is applicable. An interesting extension of Chari (2007) would be to look at interventions in the JPY/USD rate over a time period encompassing both JPY intervention sales and JPY intervention purchases in order to test if asymmetries are also present in a floating exchange rate system.
Foreign Exchange Market Conditions
In order to test the third and final part of Proposition 1, that the effects of intervention on the exchange rate spread depend on the volatility of the foreign exchange market, we distinguish between interventions that occur on "high-volatility" days and interventions that occur on "normal" days. We define a "high-volatility" day as a day with either a significant intraday volatility jump, i.e. a "jump-day" as defined in Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007) , or with a daily realized volatility that is at least the average realized volatility of the sample plus two times its standard deviation. A "normal" day is defined as all other days. Table 4 displays the results of re-estimating the conditional mean model (Equation 2) with intervention on "high-volatility" days and intervention on "normal" days entering as separate variables. As before, we first carry out a preliminary estimation that does not distinguish between intervention purchases and sales. The results are displayed in the first column of Table 4 and show a complete absence of significant effects of intervention on the exchange rate spread regardless of the state of the market.
The second column of Table 4 shows the results of the conditional mean model when distinguishing between "high-volatility" and "normal" days across separate intervention purchases and intervention sales variables, i.e. intervention is divided into four separate intervention variables (intervention purchases when the market is volatile, intervention purchases when the market is normal, intervention sales when the market is volatile, and intervention sales when the market is normal). Consistent with the baseline estimations, the results show that intervention purchases of the smaller currency decrease the exchange rate spread while intervention sales increase the spread, but only for interventions carried out on days when the market conditions are not considered volatile.
While these results further confirm the necessity of taking into account that intervention purchases and sales impact the exchange rate spread in opposite directions, they also show that the significant and asymmetric effects of intervention purchases and sales are not uniform across intervention days, but stem from the effects of interventions that are carried out on days when the market is normal rather than volatile. This is consistent with the third prediction of Proposition 1.
Although Dominguez (2003) does not consider exchange rate spreads, it is interesting to notice that, in her intraday study of intervention in the JPY/USD rate over the 1987 to 1993 period, intervention is more influential when trading volume is high.
This is the opposite of what we find (to the extent that high market volatility is usually equated with high trading volume). The reason for this discrepancy is likely due to the fact that she is investigating interventions aimed at calming disorderly markets (in a flexible exchange rate system), thus interventions that are triggered by and primarily occur when the market is volatile market. By contrast, our study pertains to interventions aimed at confirming credibility of an exchange rate peg, thus interventions that are not triggered by a volatile market but interventions that, as we hypothesize, are less likely to induce a detectable change in the market conditions if markets are volatile.
Robustness
In order to test the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the baseline model using a different econometric procedure, take into account the possibility that the intervention variables contain expected components, control for macro news surprises, include lags and leads of the intervention variables, and test for structural breaks to ensure that our parameter estimates are stable across the sample period.
24
First, the gain in efficiency from the WLS procedure is potentially costly in terms of inconsistent estimates if the residuals from the initial estimation of Equation (2) are improperly fitted in the volatility model described by Equation (3). In order to address this potential concern, and to test the robustness of our results by using a procedure that does not require estimation in stages, we re-estimate the baseline model using heteroskedasticity-and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors (i.e. we reestimate Equation 2 using HAC errors). The HAC results are qualitatively identical to the conditional mean results based on the WLS procedure.
Second, while there is no reason to believe that intervention is triggered by the contemporaneous exchange rate spread (i.e. the change in exchange rate spread that occurs over the 5-minute interval within which intervention is carried out), intervention is nevertheless correlated with recent (lagged) exchange rate movements and with recent (lagged) intervention, even at the intraday frequency. Therefore, our intervention variables are likely comprised of unexpected as well as expected components. To ensure that failure to disentangle the latter from the former does not lead to an underestimation of the true impact of intervention on exchange rate spreads, we follow Naranjo and
Nimalendran (2000) and others by estimating a central bank reaction function to capture the expected component of the (in our context) intraday intervention variable. In turn, we subtract the expected component of intervention from the actual intervention variables in intervals where the latter are non-zero. The resulting series constitute proxies for unexpected interventions. 25 The results of estimating the effects of unexpected intervention on exchange rate spreads are displayed in Table 5 (the first column shows the results when all interventions are contained in one variable while the second column shows the results using separate intervention sales and purchases variables). As the table shows, the results are qualitatively identical to the comparable estimation results from estimations that do not distinguish between actual intervention and unexpected intervention. This is unsurprising considering that the reaction function estimations explain only a minor part of the interventions (R 2 values are below 2 percent).
Third, to ensure that our estimated effects of intervention are not tainted by the coincidental arrival of macro news, we extend our analysis to include time-stamped Danish, German, and Euro-area macro surprises. This is important because macro surprises can change the perception of the market in regards to whether a currency is properly aligned with fundamentals, i.e. we need to make sure that what we label the reaction of the market to unannounced interventions is not in actuality a matter of the market adjusting to macro news. To address this concern we include macro surprises Table 6 , show that a few of the macro surprises influence the spread. More importantly, the results regarding the asymmetric effects of intervention purchases and sales remain.
Fourth, in order to test for delayed effects of intervention, we re-estimate our baseline models with 12 lags (60 minutes) of both intervention purchases and intervention sales included (i.e. we set K=H=12 in Equation 2). The results show no systematic pattern of delayed effects and, moreover, the previously discussed asymmetric contemporaneous effects of intervention purchases and sales, respectively, are unchanged.
Fifth, we address the possibility that the market anticipates and, therefore, reacts in advance of the interventions by testing for the presence of lead effects. Specifically, we add two (10 minutes) and, subsequently, six leads (30 minutes) of intervention purchases and intervention sales to the baseline conditional mean model (Equation 2). None of the leads is individually significant and, moreover, the respective sums of leads (two or six leads) are not significantly different from zero.
Sixth, to ensure that our parameter estimates are valid across the entire sample period we employ the Andrews (1993) test for unknown break point. The test does not detect any evidence of a break point and, therefore, we accept the hypothesis of parameter stability across our sample.
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In sum, all our robustness checks confirm that intervention aimed at strengthening the smaller currency (i.e. sales of EUR against purchases of DKK) decreases the exchange rate spread while intervention aimed at depreciating the smaller currency (i.e.
purchases of EUR against sales of DKK) increases the spread.
Conclusion
The context of our paper is that of unilateral intervention in a pegged exchange rate system. Our theoretical framework suggests that unannounced interventions of which the foreign exchange market customers cannot know the origin and, therefore, observe simply as large order flows, significantly affect the market's perception of whether a currency is under-or overvalued in an asymmetric manner. We hypothesize that the traders who determine market liquidity become uncertain regarding whether the price of the smaller currency is properly aligned with fundamentals when the central bank intervenes with an opaque sale of said currency, a sale that due to its unknown origin might be falsely attributed to pressure on the smaller currency. This increased uncertainty is then manifested in an increase in the exchange rate bid-ask spread. By contrast, a large purchase of a smaller currency is unlikely to indicate pressure against the large currency, but might instead be interpreted as a confirmation of the credibility of the peg and, as a result, lead to reduced uncertainty about the price of the smaller currency. This reduced uncertainty will then materialize itself in a narrowing of the spread.
We test the predictions of our theoretical framework on time-stamped intraday intervention data provided by the Danish central bank, along with indicative 5-minute spot bid and ask DKK/EUR exchange rate quotes over the 1 August 2002 to 31
December 2004 period. Importantly, the Danish interventions are not carried out to calm disorderly markets; rather they are intended to assure the financial markets that Denmark is committed to keeping the DKK/EUR rate virtually fixed.
Consistent with our hypothesis the results of our time-series estimations show that intervention purchases of DKK (the smaller currency) decrease the spread while intervention sales of DKK increase the spread. This key result holds up against an array of robustness checks, including controlling for endogeneity, coincidental arrival of macro news, testing for break-points, and allowing for the possibility of delayed as well as lead effects. We also show that the significant asymmetric effects of intervention purchases and sales stem from days when the market is normal rather than volatile. This finding confirms our priors regarding the importance of market conditions and, particularly, that intervention does not affect the bid-ask spread when the market is volatile.
In sum, our study is the first to analyze the effects of intervention on exchange rate spreads in the context of pegged exchange rates, and it is the first to analyze the intraday effects of unannounced interventions on exchange rate spreads using official intraday data. Our study showcases the importance of distinguishing between intervention purchases and intervention sales, and the importance of market volatility, when analyzing intervention in a pegged exchange rate system. More generally, our results point to the importance of considering asymmetries and market conditions when assessing the influence of large trades, such as intervention transactions, in foreign exchange markets. NOTES: (a) * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes significance at 99% (b) Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; lags in ( ) in Variable Name (c) Estimations are defined in Equation (2) in the text, and carried out using WLS (d) The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread (e) The independent variables are current intervention, and lags of the dependent variable (f) R 2 is not applicable to the two-stage WLS estimation procedure. NOTES: (a) * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes significance at 99% (b) Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates (c) Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances (d) The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread (e) Column 1: The independent variables are current intervention on "highvolatility" days (denoted by subscript J), current intervention on "normal" days (denoted by subscript NJ), and lags of the dependent variable. Column 2: The independent variables are current intervention sales of EUR on "high-volatility" days (denoted by subscript SJ), current intervention sales of EUR on "normal" volatility days (denoted by subscript SNJ), current intervention purchases of EUR on "high-volatility" days (denoted by subscript PJ), current intervention purchases of EUR on "normal" days (denoted by subscript PNJ), and lags of the dependent variable (f) A "high-volatility day" is defined as a day with either a significant intraday volatility jump, i.e. a "jump-day" as defined in Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007) , or with a daily realized volatility that is at least the average realized volatility of the sample plus two times the standard deviation of the realized volatility of the sample; a "normal" day is defined as all other intervention days (g) The coefficient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of the dependent variable not shown for ease of exposition NOTES: (a) * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes significance at 99% (b) Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates (c) Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances (d) The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread (e) Column 1: The independent variables are contemporaneous unexpected intervention (denoted by subscript U) and lags of the dependent variable. Column 2: The independent variables are contemporaneous unexpected intervention sales of EUR (denoted by subscript US), current intervention purchases of EUR (denoted by subscript UP), and lags of the dependent variable (f) Unexpected intervention is proxied by the residual of an intervention reaction function estimation (g) The coefficient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of the dependent variable not shown for ease of exposition 
